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NOTE
PATENT ACQUISITIONS, SECTION 7, AND PUBLIC
POLICY
In order to stem the increasing rate of industrial concentration
in this country, Congress, in 1950, amended Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, broadening the number of acquisitions deemed illegal
thereunder.' To what extent patent acquisitions are covered by
this amendment is a vexing and, of late, an often-asked question.
Rather than attempt to directly answer this question, this effort will
raise factors considered to be of importance in seeking a solution
to the problem. Because patent acquisitions present a fnique prob-
lem, an unfettered inquiry into a statute that has been construed
by the highest court of the land appears justified.
I. GENERAL APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO PATENT Ac-
QUISITIONS
Recently, some observers and critics of the patent system have
called for an evaluation of patent acquisitions and their relationship
to the antitrust laws.2 Although it has seldom been suggested that
patent acquisitions should be exempt from the antitrust laws, in
practice few patent acquisitions have been challenged under such
laws. This situation can, perhaps, be attributed to the required
standards of proof in this area which, in the past, have presented
serious evidentiary obstacles. For example, a violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Act 3 is established only when a dominant com-
pany, through acquisition, secures a significant number of the pat-
ents in a field. Although a showing of market power is ordinarily
I. Relevant portions of this Act read:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation . . . shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monop-
oly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
2. See Davis, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws: Some Recent Developments, 46
J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 12 (1964); Heymah, Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws-A
Reappraisal at the Close of the Decade, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 537 (1969); Murchison, Patent
Acquisitions and the Antitrust Laws, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 663 (1967); Turner, Patents, Anti-
trust, and Innovation, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 277 (1967).
3. This section covers: "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize."
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essential for purposes of proving such a violation, no such power
need be shown if it can be established that the company has made
an "attempt to monopolize" the market. Proof of such an attempt,
however, is a hardy task, since it is very difficult to show a subjec-
tive specific intent to monopolize. Further, while patent acquisi-
tions may be held violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 4 where
the contract of acquisition is held to be in restraint of trade, the
applicable standard is far from clear, as each case must be mea-
sured by the "rule of reason." It is doubtful whether an acquisition,
without a showing of some anti-competitive intent, would be suffi-
cient to satisfy this rule. Thus, it is apparent why patent acquisi-
tions have been, for the most part, free from litigational at-
tack-the evidentiary hurdle presented is a difficult obstacle to
overcome.
For this reason, it seems logical to assume that any future
attack of patent acquitions wil l be brought under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. This section, commonly known as the anti-merger
section, is adaptable to such an attack because the standard of
proof needed to show a violation is nominal. Congress having en-
acted this section in order to curb market power in its incipiency,
a showing of mere probable lessening of competition is sufficient
to render an acquisition illegal, notwithstanding the intent of the
acquirer.
Although it is clear that acquisitions of patents can lead to the
type of excessive market power of which Congress was speaking,
it is not certain that the congressional intent was to have Section 7
encompass patent acquisitions. Indeed, the legislative history
appears devoid of any mention of patent acquisitions. However,
this does not mean that the spirit of the law cannot be construed
so as to include them.5 It merely means that the question appears
to be one never contemplated by Congress.
6
4. This section provides: "Every contract . . . in restraint of trade . . . is hereby de-
clared to be illegal."
5. Although the Supreme Court has never considered the legislative history in the context
of patent acquisitions, most observers agree with the language used in United States v.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). In discussing what transac-
tions fit into § 7, the court stated, at 182:
As used here, the words "acquire" and "assets" are not terms of art or technical
legal language. . . they are generic, imprecise terms encompassing a broad spectrum
of transactions. . . . As used in the statute and depending upon the factual context,
"assets" may mean anything of value.
6. See Weinstein, The Application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to Patents, Copy-
rights, and Trademarks, 5 PAT. T.M. & C.J. 328 (1961).
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Whether Congress did or did not intend patent acquisitions to
be subject to Section 7 is, therefore, problematic. Perhaps the cru-
cial question to be confronted within the next few years will be
whether patent acquisitions should be analyzed with other merger
problems or, because of their unique character, treated as a special
sort of problem. If treated separately, at what point should patent
acquisitions be halted in order to best satisfy the aims of the patent
system?
II. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF PATENT ACQUIsITIONS
As mentioned previously, in an orthodox Section 7 action, the
primary issue to be determined is whether the acquisition will prob-
ably result in a substantial lessening of competition. Prior to the
resolution of this issue, inquiries must also be made into the rele-
vant product and geographic markets. Additionally, percentage
control by the acquiring company over these markets must be de-
termined. The answers to these sub-issues have a direct bearing on
the court's determination of whether a substantial lessening of
competition does, in fact, exist.
Because there are many factors present in a patent-acquisition
action which are nonexistent in an orthodox Section 7 case, it is
doubtful whether the above analysis of the latter type of action can
be made applicable to the former. As an analysis not giving due
weight to these differing factors may yield a result contrary to the
public good, before the Justice Department seeks to prosecute an
alleged violator or before a court attempts to examine such a case,
it should take note of the special nature of these patent acquisitions.
In particular, four distinctive features of patent acquisitions
should be considered apart from the customary Section 7 ap-
proach. While the most obvious factor to be considered is the effect
of the acquisition upon competition, equally cogent are the value
of the patent, the need for a patent market, and the intent of the
acquirer--each of which will be treated separately.
A. Value of the Patent
Unlike tangible assets, which can be rather accurately priced,
thereby making quantification of their increased market power a
relatively simple matter, intangible assets, such as patents, cannot
be easily assessed. Because a patent's value is the product of many
variables, hasty estimates of the amount of market power the ac-
quirer has gained may be illusory.
Were the patent first exploited and later assigned or licensed,
[Vol. 55
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its value would be more readily determinable. Unfortunately, in
practice the converse is more often the case; that is, before any
large-scale manufacturing or marketing takes place, the patent is
sold or licensed to another, usually because a smaller company
lacks the necessary capital to exploit the patent.
At the outset, it must be recognized that the party who acquires
such a non-exploited patent may not necessarily be adding substan-
tially to his market power. Because the capital outlay that must be
made and the risks inherent in the production and marketing of the
patented product may be enormous, the acquirer may realize a
profit on his investment only after many years of diligent toil.
Because of this, it is important that an analysis of patent worth
take note of not only the theoretical value of the patent, but also
its importance in a practical context. A company may be able to
close off an entire area of competition with one important patent
acquisition 7 without substantial change in its marketing or produc-
tion policy. On the other hand, as noted, the patent may be only
potentially lucrative, with its ultimate success contingent upon
sound business judgment. These two types of cases, along with the
myriad of others between the two extremes, must be distinguished
and given due weight in a Section 7 analysis. This is so because a
company acquiring a patent which is only potentially powerful
should not be penalized when, through that company's own exper-
tise, the patent ultimately bestows market power upon the acquirer.
This sort of patent acquisition and internal development more
closely resembles internal discovery of patents, which has been
excluded from Section 7 scrutiny.8
To ignore this distinction would be to deprive society of the
advantages inherent in fair and aggressive competition for the best
product. Unfortunately, this short-run benefit could very easily be
sidestepped in favor of the long-run protection afforded by the
orthodox Section 7 standard. While it can be argued that with
regard to stock acquisition Congress intended that the probable
lessening of competition in the long run be avoided, it is questiona-
7. For an example of dominant patent position, see United States v. United Shoe Machi-
nery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954),
wherein United Shoe held 3,915 patents. An important patent acquisition by a company with
such dominance would be of questionable legality under § 7.
8. In Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), the
Supreme Court held that the mere accumulation of patents, regardless of how many, is not
in and of itself illegal. However, this proposition has been interpreted by many as referring
only to patents acquired by internal processes.
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ble whether the same reasoning can be applied to patent acquisi-
tions. Further, a counter-argument can be made that the societal
short-run benefit gained by internal patent development is, in itself,
strong reason for making the Section 7 standard nearer to "ac-
tual," rather than "probable," lessening of competition-the net
effect being to postpone prosecution of a dominant 9 patent acquirer
until the harm caused to society is real, rather than imagined.
The argument for a different standard for patent acquisitions
becomes even stronger when we consider the fact that many acquis-
itions are of a non-exclusive nature. 0 It may be assumed that the
value of such a- non-exclusive license, in terms of market power
conferred, is in most cases substantially below that of an exclusive
license or assignment. Some observers have maintained that the
acquirer receives nothing more than the licensor's promise not to
sue for infringement." While this is true, it is apparent that the
licensee, in addition, has at least potentially increased his market
power. The non-exclusive nature of the right, however, seems to
guarantee that there will be some competition, albeit not perfect,
during the life of the patent; and after expiration of the patent, an
even more vigorous competition may be envisioned, since the bar-
riers to entry will probably be less severe. Thus, society may, pro-
verbially, have its cake and eat it too. It can take advantage of all
the benefits inherent in developing the patent on a widespread basis
without becoming overly concerned about long-run dominance of
the market.
9. The question of when a company becomes dominant in a given field is a difficult one
to answer. As pointed out in Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962),
within broad markets there may exist sub-markets which are well defined and appropriate
for antitrust analysis. Therefore, when one seeks to determine how valuable a given patent
acquisition is to the assignee in question, the market in which the patent fits should be
measured against the market in which the acquirer enjoys his alleged dominance. In other
words, horizontal acquisitions should be distinguished from vertical acquisitions.
10. Recognizing the distinction between non-exclusive and exclusive rights, the court in
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), stated, at 333:
United contends that the patents acquired by United have been generally to enable
it to pursue development which might otherwise have been blocked, or to resolve
patent controversies, or for hedging purposes. But most of these purposes could have
been served by non-exclusive licenses. Taking the further step of acquiring the patents
has . . . buttressed United's market power. In some instances . . . the acquisition
made it less likely that United would have competition.
11. See note 2 supra. Under the broad test for "assets" proposed by the court in United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), wherein an "asset"
refers to "anything of value," even a promise not to sue could be considered an asset, since
such a promise bestows upon the promisee value he otherwise would not receive.
[Vol. 55
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In summary, the value of patent acquisitions is most difficult
to measure. Although they may confer unacceptable market power
on the acquirer, critical analysis of the unique nature of patents
may show that the overall benefit to society favors a substantial
number of the acquisitions. It would, therefore, be error to group
patent acquitions with other acquisitions subject to the stringent
Section 7 test.
B. The Need for a Patent Market
Smaller companies often assign their patent rights to firms that
can more efficiently product and market the end product. Because
there is statutory authority for such a transaction, 2 the transfer is
not, in itself, invalid. However, if the acquirer has a dominant
position in the field and acquisition enhances that position, Section
7 may, theoretically, be violated. Court-imposed divestiture of such
acquisitions raises serious questions concerning the effect of such
action on the patent market. It seems logical to conclude that to
the extent that patent transfers are not permitted under Section 7,
a greater number of potential patentees will forego the tedious task
of securing a patent. 13 Of course, many patentees are sole proprie-
tors who, having been exempted from the necessity of compliance
with Section 7, will not be discouraged."4 However, the remaining
patentees who may otherwise wish to transfer their right would
seemingly reduce investment in research and development to the
degree that their transfer would be blocked. 15 Consequently, the
number of companies engaged in research would presumably dwin-
dle until patent development would be handled solely by the larger
companies." Thus, accepting these assumptions as true, an over-
12. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1971).
13. See address sponsored by the American Society of Inventors in 27 PAT. T.M. & C.J.
AA-9 (1971), wherein the speaker asked:
Why force inventions to be developed only by companies large enough to do the whole
job themselves? To do so is actually to work in favor of monopolies and trusts.
14. This group accounts for approximately forty per cent of the total number of patents
issued. While a company acquiring a patent from an individual may still be prosecuted, it
will be under the more stringent proof requirements of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
15. Some critics have maintained that this reduction in the transferability of patents is,
in the long run, beneficial to society because it alleviates the problem of concentration. See
Murchison, note 2 supra, at 708. However, most of these critics would presumably find an
exception in two cases: (1) where the patentee is a failing company in need of a significant
royalty in order to remain a viable competitor; and (2) where the patented product or process
is such that no one but the dominant acquirer can profitably exploit the patent. Were these
exceptions not recognized, the patentee could conceivably be left with the bare right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling.
16. Note 13 supra.
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zealous anticoncentration campaign could lead to the anomalous
result of increased concentration. Whether, and to what extent,
patent concentration is good or bad will be considered in a subse-
quent section of this article. 7
Without regard to the level of innovative activity among small
companies, there are other reasons for the argument in favor of
easy transferability of patent rights. The number of patent disputes
that are settled rather than litigated is said, by some, to be due to
the availability of licensing and assignment as alternatives to litiga-
tion. Rather than take part in an expensive and time-consuming
lawsuit, a company may be willing to license or assign the patent
to its adversary. Were Section 7 to prohibit a substantial number
of companies from making such a disposition, the burden of decid-
ing who actually deserved the patent right would fall on the courts.
Furthermore, there is a very basic reason for insuring that a
patent be easily transferrable. In an economic system such as ours,
where prices and supply of goods are theoretically determined by
the give and take of competing demands, it seems inconsistent to
prohibit the transfer of a property right. Only through transfer will
the property be used in the most economically efficient method.
Moreover, unless bidding for the property is permitted, the market
price will not reflect the patent's true value. This is not to say,
however, that we should at no time tamper with-this-iddilJmodel.
Nevertheless, we should recoghize when we are markedly departing
from free-market ideas and invoke such a remedy only when the
harm to society is quite clear. Implicit in this assumption is the
premise that because patents need to be handled with greater skill
in order to be initially accepted by society, the blocking of patent
markets will more severely limit total efficiency than the blocking
of normal transactions. With improper marketing and develop-
ment, a patent may ultimately be useless to society even though,
when granted, it was of potential utility.
In summary, an analysis of the need for a patent market raises
issues which must be determined apart from the primary issue to
be determined in traditional Section 7 cases. Because a substantial
reduction in the transferability of patents may, in effect, be con-
17. This being a most difficult question to resolve in a non-patent setting, consideration
of it in the context of patents increases the complexity. While, on the one hand, the social
effectiveness of the patent system depends upon diffusion of patent ownership and the
resultant increase of competition, on the other hand, the ultimate goal of that competition
is to eliminate competitors and, thus, assure nonwaste of research dollars.
[Vol. 55
NOTE
trary to the public interest, before a patent acquisition is con-
demned as lessening competition, the effect of such a prohibition
on the marketability of the patent should be closely analyzed.
C. The Intent of the Acquirer
As mentioned earlier, in orthodox Section 7 cases, good inten-
tions cannot redeem an acquisition which will probably result in a
substantial lessening of competition. Consequently, intent of the
acquirer is not an issue in that type of case. With patent acquisi-
tions, however, it appears that the intention of the acquirer is a very
relevant consideration.
Generally, as seen in the above discussion, there are factors
present in the case of patent acquisitions which gravitate against
the position that concentration per se is contrary to the best inter-
ests of society. While more will be said henceforth on the advan-
tages and evils of concentration, let it suffice here to say that the
threat posed by patent acquisitions need not be halted in its
incipiency.
Moreover, the difficult task of proving an anti-competitive in-
tent in a normal acquisition appears to be mitigated in the case of
patent acquisitions by certain signposts which point to an anti-
competitive motive. For example, if the acquisition were that of a
patent which could not possibly be used to lower the acquirer's
production costs or otherwise directly benefit him, it could clearly
be implied that he intended to stultify competition. While this is
particularly true with respect to assignments, it may also very well
be the case if an exclusive license were granted. While there will be
cases wherein it is unclear as to whether or not the patent will
benefit the acquirer, in a short time the acquirer's subsequent ac-
tions should demonstrate whether the acquisition was merely an
attempt to block future competition.
The nature of the acquisition provides an even clearer indication
of the acquirer's motives. Only in rare cases will a non-exclusive
license indicate an attempt to lessen competition, 18 for the very
nature of such a license tends to provide more competitors in the
market, both during and after the life of the patent. On the other
hand, as we move closer to acquisitions that vest absolute control
in the licensee or assignee, his anti-competitive motives should be
easier to prove. Thus, the difficult evidentiary problems inherent in
18. Note lOsupra.
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most Section 7 cases are notably absent to the same extent in
patent-acquisition cases. For these reasons, the intent of the ac-
quirer should be a factor given due weight in a Section 7 patent-
acquisition action.
III. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS IN PATENT-ACQUISITION CASES
The considerations discussed above are, for the most part, listed
in an Attorney General's Committee Report published several
years ago.1" If the government is to base its decision to prosecute
on societal principles, the factors presented in this report are cer-
tainly the material elements to be focused upon. However, there is
a danger with this seriate approach to the problem-namely, any
given element may be given undue emphasis. Indeed, an emphasis
inconsistent with sound social policy may yield an unfortunate
result.
As discussed above, all arguments in a typical Section 7 case
tend to evolve around the question of whether there will be a proba-
ble lessening of competition as a result of the acquisition. Courts
have readily expanded and contracted the concept of a "relevant"
market to suit their own judgment as to the actual lessening of
competition.20 Whether these Procrustean definitions of markets
have been beneficial or deleterious to society presents a problem
beyond the scope of this article. What is important, however, is a
keen recognition of the ease with which a divestiture order can be
fashioned.
Projecting this type of analysis into the area of patent acquisi-
tions would, in the opinion of this writer, be an unfortunate and
counterproductive method of resolving problems. As pointed out,
19. ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMMITTEE, ANTITRUST REP. 227 (1955). In this report, factors
mentioned as being worthy of consideration included the nature, number and value of
patents acquired in relation to the market for competing patented or unpatented processes
or products, the purpose and effect of the purchase, and the decrease or increase in competi-
tion in the relevant geographic and product market. Also to be considered are whether the
inventor is using or has the ability to use the patent, as measured against the purchaser's
intended use, and whether the purchase had the purpose and probable effect of resolving
conflict.
20. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), at 591, wherein J. Fortas,
by way of dissent, argued that the Court had manipulated the market concept to fit the case
before it. In hiswords:
This Court now approves this strange red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-
limp- classification. . . .Moreover, we are told that the "relevant market" must
assume this strange and curious configuration despite evidence . ..that "fringe
competition" . has, in at least twenty cities, forced the defendants to operate at
a "loss ....
[Vol. 55
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there are factors in patent-acquisition cases that ought to be consid-
ered separately from the issue of whether or not a lessening of
competition will result. Such factors as increased short-run bene-
fits, maintenance of a viable patent market, and easier identifica-
tion of the acquirer's motive should be dealt with on an individual
basis. Should these factors not be given due weight, we would be
running the risk of reaching results contrary to the public interest.
Recognizing that the burden of proving a Section 7 violation is
meager indeed, we find patent acquisitions to be potentially more
vulnerable to attack than even the traditional acquisitions.2 1 Partic-
ularly is this true in light of the fact that a patent, by its very nature,
can be characterized as a grant of a monopoly. In addition, the
acquirer is usually a company of substantial size, enjoying a certain
degree of dominance in the market. Taking note of these realities,
one can readily see how proving that a patent acquisition probably
lessens competition can be reduced to an elementary task.
In light of this inherent vulnerability of patent acquisitions, it
seems that overzealous prosecution of these transactions could be
harmful to the public good. Contrariwise, a wait-and-see approach
on the part of the government seems to pose a lesser risk of harm
to society.
The question, then, really comes down to one of knowing when
certain acquisitions are being used to manipulate our competitive
system. In the opinion of this writer, the burden of proving such
anti-competitive conduct should be established in an approach
nearer to that connected with Sherman Act violations, rather than
the incipiency approach required by Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Since the soundest interpretation of the legislative history be-
hind Section 7 appears to be that patent acquisitions were neither
included nor excluded, such acquisitions should be dealt with as a
distinct phenomenon. While it would be desirous that Congress
speak on the standard and the factors to be considered in patent
acquisition cases, from a more practical viewpoint it appears that
the more immediate action in this area will come from the judicial
sphere. 22 When and if cases of this nature reach the courts in sub-
21. Stedman, Acquisition of Patents and Know-How by Grant, Fraud, Purchase and
Grant-Back, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 199 (1967).
22. Although one case of this nature did get to the Supreme Court, the issue of a
dominant firm's acquisition of a patent dominating the industry was not considered, that
issue being expressly saved by the Court for future consideration. United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189 (1963).
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stantial numbers, it is hoped that not only the unique nature of
patents will be given due weight, but also that the patent system,
in general, will be recognized for its contributions to our technol-
ogy. This broader question concerning the value of the patent sys-
tem to our society is directly related to the need for proceeding
cautiously when attacking patent-related transactions. For this rea-
son, it appears appropriate to briefly comment upon the costs and
benefits of the patent system.
IV. THE VALUE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM TO SOCIETY
The principal goal of the patent system is to provide society
with an adequate supply of inventions and, through such innova-
tion, to make society a better place in which to live. 23 Although a
certain number of inventions would obviously be developed without
such a system, inquiry must focus upon the word, "adequate." To
achieve this level of adequacy, there must be some type of incentive
provided which will encourage large investment in research and
development of new ideas.24 Such incentive is provided under our
system by giving the developer of a new idea the right to exclude
others from using or selling that idea for a limited time.
Assuming for the moment that this is the best method of assur-
ing an adequate supply of inventions, it must nevertheless be recog-
nized that use of this system is not without its costs to society. By
way of illustration, but not limitation, some often-stated criticisms
follow.
It has been claimed that the monopoly thus created allows a
patentee to set his price at a level that is not commensurate with
his cost of production. 25 This argument, however, fails to take into
account recoupment of research expenses, which is a substantial
part of the patentee's investment. To be sure, the patentee is given
a great deal more freedom in the market than is the case where
there is normal competition. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, clause 8.
24. Recognizing the problems surrounding incentives, one writer noted:
[i]nventions, however, consist only of ideas which rivals can often acquire without
cost to themselves. . . . Where this occurs no one will be under any constraint to
take invention costs into account in setting production rates or selling prices of
products which embody or utilize the invention. . . . The problem of policy is to
determine what supply of inventions is needed.
ABRAMSON, THE PATENT SYSTEM: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASIS, STUDY No. 26,
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1960).
25. Id.
[Vol. 55
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o to assume that the patentee is absolutely free from competition.
The development of a new idea can cause the inventor's competi-
tors to redouble their efforts so that they will not lose their previous
share of the market. Although this is not price competition, it is a
form of competition that cannot be ignored. 26 Moreover, it is hard
to conceive of a product or process so unique that it creates an
absolutely inelastic demand. That is to say, there are always prod-
ucts sufficiently interchangeable so that if the price of the new
product were too high, the public could avoid the psychological
need to purchase it.
Another often-stated criticism of the system is that a premium
is placed on bigness. Although it is undoubtedly true that the larger
research facilities stand a better chance of producing a patentable
product and that, in this sense, the system encourages concentra-
tion of industry, it does not necessarily follow that all concentrated
industries are disabling to society. While concentration should be
attacked when it is harmful to society, it should also be credited
when it is beneficial.21 Undoubtedly, a certain degree of concentra-
tion is in the public interest. The difficult problem is determining
when that concentration becomes deleterious.
In the past few years, there have been a number of suggested
alternatives to the patent system. One study, undertaken at the
behest of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights,s called for the complete abolition of the patent system.
In its place, the author opted for a governmentally-subsidized pro-
gram of stipends to non-profit institutions which seek to produce
knowledge as an end in itself.29 Needless to say, such a system
26. As one writer recognized, in analyzing price competition: "[l]t is not that kind or
competition that counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new source of
supply, the new type of organization." SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 84 (1950). See also 1971 Am. PATENT LAW Ass'N BULL. 356.
27. Recognizing that market power serves as the protector of the incentive to technologi-
cal development, one widely-known economist has noted:
[T]here must be some element of monopoly in an industry if it is to be progres-
sive. . . . [T]he slight continuing loss of efficiency, as compared with ideal perform-
ance, resulting from possession of market power is regularly offset and more by large
gains from technological development.
J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 92
(1956).
28. MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No. 15, SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
29. This study has come under a great deal of criticism. For example, one writer has
accused Mr. Machlup of judging patents on the basis of false, biased assumptions which,
carried to their logical conclusion, would appear to counsel against scientific advance.
ABRAMSON, note 24 supra, at n.37.
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would substitute private wants for those of the state, hypothetically,
resulting in an inadequate supply of inventions in terms of satisfy-
ing the needs of society. Other critics have suggested that prizes be
granted to the inventor when the government deemed his contribu-
tion "successful." Again, this seemingly places too much control
in the state's choice. But moreover, uncertainty as to whether the
prize would, in fact, find its way to the developer of the best inven-
tion could very understandably make investors reluctant to expend
large sums of money for research.
In summary, the precise amount of incentive that must be pro-
vided in order to assure society of an adequate supply of inventions
is, at best, problematic. Arguments concerning the question of
whether the benefits of the sysem justify the costs to society are also
difficult to resolve from an objective standpoint.30 However, it
would be difficult to refute the argument that our technology has
advanced rapidly during the last century largely as a result of the
incentive provided by the patent system.3 ' For this reason, any
challenge of a patent transaction should confront the broader ques-
tions raised by this demonstrated success.
V. CONCLUSION
The interrelationship of patent and antitrust policy embraces
matters usually of extreme complexity. It is, therefore, difficult to
set forth rules that can be applied with clarity to the many and
varied problems in this area. While important considerations may
be listed in seriatum, this approach does not guarantee a desirable
solution; it merely lessens the burden of analysis. The critical prob-
lem of determining which factors deserve the greatest emphasis
cannot be solved without an in-depth study of the situation.
With regard to patent acquisitions and their relation to Section
7 of the Clayton Act, we must realize that the unique nature of
patents calls for special treatment. While in certain cases it may
be tempting to apply the orthodox incipiency standard of Section
7, the inherent vulnerability of patents renders this approach overly
harsh. Simplistic solutions such as this may, in effect, exacerbate
the very problem sought to be resolved.
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